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Super-weapons and Subversion: British Deterrence by Deception Operations in the Early Cold War 
 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in the 
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This article examines British deception operations in the early Cold War. It illustrates how, in 
the years before Britain could threaten atomic retaliation, Britain’s deception organisation, 
the London Controlling Section (LCS) was tasked with conducting operations to deter the 
USSR and China from starting a war or threatening British interests. It introduces a number 
of their ploys – some physical and military, others subversive and political. It argues that the 
LCS faced significant challenges in implementing its deceptions. Repeating the great strategic 
successes of the Second World War was extremely difficult; what remained for the Cold War 
were more limited deceptions.   
 
 
Key Words: British intelligence, deception, deterrence, London Controlling Section, Directorate of 
Forward Plans. 
Introduction 
Few areas of statecraft are more secret than deception operations. Intelligence agencies, fearful of 
compromising ongoing activities, remain wary of revealing historical operations and techniques. This 
secrecy is reflected in the scholarly analysis of British deception, which has until recently focused 
overwhelmingly on the Second World War. The documentary evidence has allowed little more, and 
the practice rarely features in the historiography of the Cold War. Its relative absence from the 
literature suggests Britain may have lost its appetite for deception after 1945, but this was not the 
case.1  
This article examines British deception policy and deception for deterrence operations in the early 
years of the Cold War, before Britain gained an atomic capability. It is based on recent documentary 
                                                          
1 Deception in the Cold War is discussed to a greater or lesser degree by Julian Lewis, Changing Direction: 
British Military Planning for Post-War Strategic Defence, 1942-47 (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Richard J. 
Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London: John Murray, 2001); 
Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning Armageddon, (Amsterdam: Routledge, 2000); Stephen Twigge and Len 
Scott, ‘Strategic Defence by Deception’ Intelligence and National Security 16/2 (2001); Len Scott and Huw 
Dylan, ‘Cover for Thor: Divine Deception Planning for Cold War Missiles’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 33/5 
(2010); Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers: Allied military Deception in the Second World War (London: Phoenix, 
2005); Stephen Dorril, MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations (London: Fourth Estate, 2000).  
2 
 
releases that allow us to trace the contours of Cold War deception and to draw some conclusions 
about its uses and limits. It expands our understanding of British deception in four areas: what 
happened to the deception machinery after the war; what did politicians and planners think it could 
achieve in a Cold War context; what kinds of deception for deterrence operations were planned and 
implemented against the USSR and China; what challenges did Britain face when attempting to 
deceive Cold War rivals?  It illustrates how the deception machinery evolved in the late 1940s in the 
context of the Soviet strategic threat. It argues that the organisation was engaged in forming plans 
for future war, supporting British rule in the colonies, and in designing ad-hoc schemes to support 
British interests in response to crises, but that in the early years of the Cold War supporting Britain’s 
strategy of deterrence became the deceivers’ primary objective. Using a variety of techniques, and 
some imaginative plans, they attempted to exaggerate British strength, disguise its weaknesses, and 
to persuade Stalin to focus on internal security rather than foreign aggression.  However, Britain 
faced considerable difficulties in implementing many of its ambitious, strategic schemes; what 
remained practical in Cold War conditions were limited operations. 
 
The Deception Organisation 
Britain’s deception machinery was severely cut in 1945. Its very survival was due to an initiative by 
the Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff (CoS), Leslie Hollis, who had discussed the matter with Dudley 
Clarke, a senior wartime deception planner, and concluded that an organisation was required in 
peace to prepare for war. He was supported by other figures in the CoS, men like General Hastings 
Ismay, who believed that continuity was essential lest wartime lessons be forgotten.2 With their 
backing, two experienced deception officers, Clarke and Admiral John Godfrey, were tasked with 
chronicling their work in several in-house volumes, and the deception organisation, the London 
Controlling Section (LCS) survived. In 1946 it constituted three officers, one from each service.3 
Two developments prompted the transformation of the LCS from its somewhat dormant early Cold 
War existence, both related to the Soviet threat. In April 1946 Henry Tizard circulated his report on 
‘Future Development in Weapons and Methods of War’, which advocated using deception in war 
and maintaining dedicated staff in peace.4 This was approved by the Cabinet Defence Committee in 
July.5 Second, in May 1946 Stuart Menzies, Chief, or ‘C’, of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) 
                                                          
2 Lewis, Changing Direction, p.lxxv. 
3 ibid, p.lxxv. 
4 ibid, p.lxxvi. 
5 ibid, p.lxxvi. 
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supported expanding deception operations, and proposed rejuvenating the LCS. The Soviets’ 
pervasive intelligence gathering activities, he suggested, if adequately manipulated ‘may provide 
suitable channels for the transmission of deception material to the Russians at a later stage.’6 With 
more staff to ensure cooperation with the Security Service (MI5) and SIS, the LCS faced the Cold War 
with fresh terms of reference in 1947.7 
The Cold War LCS differed from its wartime variant. Its work was more difficult. It did not enjoy the 
advantages and insights its predecessor had owing to signals intelligence (SIGINT), ULTRA in 
particular. Therefore, it had to develop and utilise different techniques. Also, its role was broader. 
Planners realised that given Britain’s global presence, its relative decline, and the requirement to 
combat Communism politically and militarily, peacetime deception was ‘concerned as much with 
foreign policy as with imperial strategy.’8 Thus, the LCS required a different relationship with senior 
policy makers to the wartime arrangement. 
The matter of management and coordination was resolved in 1947 – albeit temporarily – with the 
establishment of an executive committee to oversee the LCS and ensure coordination with other 
departments. Its members were the Chief Staff Officer to the Minister of Defence, the Permanent 
Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, the Head of the Civil Service, the CoS represented by the 
Directors of Plans, the Controlling Officer, and the Chiefs of MI5 and SIS. The Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC) approved of the structure in July 1947. And the Committee was named ‘The Hollis 
Committee’ after its chairman, Leslie Hollis.9  
This arrangement survived for two years before being reformed to bring the deception organisation 
closer still to the Joint Planning Staff (JPS). The catalyst for reform was the difficulty the LCS faced in 
planning and implementing operations in 1947 and 1948. This was primarily due to the challenge of 
developing ‘channels’ to feed deceptive information into the USSR. As they noted, ‘a very limited 
number of double agents have been started, but in each case they have terminated through one 
cause or another before any useful build up has been achieved.’10 
This led some to question the utility of deception in the Cold War and the value of maintaining the 
LCS. The Hollis Committee and the ‘S Section’ of the JPS investigated the matter. Both concluded 
                                                          
6 CAB 121/110, Stuart Menzies, ‘Deception Organisation in Peace’ attached to Hollis, 6 May 1946. 
7 CAB 81/80, HC (47) 1 ‘London Controlling Section: Terms of Reference’ 8 December 1947. 
8 CAB 81/81, LCS (47) 1 ‘Deception Policy: Proposals for Future Executive Committee’ 31 March 1947. 
9 DEFE 28/76 ‘Deception Policy’ 3 July 1947. See Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, pp.371-372. 
10 DEFE 28/118, Wild ‘Deception: Report on Progress’, 4 June 1948. It remains unclear whether or not the 
Cambridge spies were responsible for this. The available LCS and DFP documents from the later 1950s that 
examine the difficulties in the late 1940s do not mention them; they do however refer to atom spies like Klaus 
Fuchs, and, later in the 1950s, to the Soviet mole in SIS George Blake. 
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that deception was viable, and that the LCS should develop techniques to counter Soviet security, 
but also that the organisation should be more closely integrated with the Joint Planners.11 The Hollis 
Committee met too infrequently to ensure working cooperation. To increase efficiency it was agreed 
that the LCS should report directly to the Directors of Plans and the Chiefs of Staff Committee. This 
rendered the Hollis Committee redundant; it met for the last time in December 1949.12 Its members 
debated who should lead the LCS under the new order: Hollis favoured an intelligence officer, 
recommending Malcolm Cumming of MI5;13 Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Bruce Fraser suggested the 
Royal Marines Colonel, R. H. Quill.14 But the position was offered to another veteran, John A. Drew.  
Drew had been involved in wartime deception and security, working at the Cabinet Office. He 
remained an advisor on deception to the Chief Staff officer to the Minister of Defence, Sir William 
Elliot, and had operated as Edward Bridges’ representative on the Hollis Committee.15 Describing 
him as a ‘real intelligence enthusiast’, Harold Parker, Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of 
Defence, recommended his appointment, and Emanuel Shinwell, the Minister of Defence, agreed in 
May 1950.16 Under Drew’s leadership the LCS gained more staff, worked closely with the JIC and the 
JPS, and expanded into the empire. It was also renamed. Drew believed the moniker attracted too 
much attention in a colonial context. The LCS briefly became the Forward Planning Section then, in 
February 1951, the Directorate of Forward Plans (DFP), with Drew as Director of Forward Plans.17 
 
The Strategic Problem and Deception Policy 
Deceptions always exist in a particular strategic context. The context defines the objectives; it also 
defines the available techniques. In war the problem is generally simpler.18 Consider the Second 
World War: the enemy was clear, there were military objectives to support, and Hitler's intelligence 
apparatus, although ruthless, was weak in crucial respects that the Allies could exploit. This context 
determined which techniques were viable: most notably, double-agents. The great wartime 
deceptions were made possible by the successes of British intelligence. MI5 ensured that practically 
all German agents in Britain were controlled, allowing British authorities to supply the Nazis with 
bogus information. Bletchley Park's code-breakers ensured the LCS and the Double-Cross Committee 
                                                          
11 FO 1093/380, LCS (49) 1, ‘Review of Overall Deception Policy’, 7 January 1949. 
12 DEFE 28/180, HC (49) 2nd Meeting, 8 December 1949. 
13 DEFE 28/180, Hollis to Elliot, 6 December 1949. 
14 DEFE 28/180, Fraser to Elliot, 3 January 1950. 
15 DEFE 28/180, Memorandum to Elliot ‘London Controlling Section’, 25 April 1950.  
16 DEFE 28/180, Elliot to Minister, 2 May 1950. 
17 DEFE 28/70, Memorandum by Drew, 14 February 1951. 
18 See J. C. Masterman, The Double-cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (London: Yale University Press). 
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could monitor the implementation of their schemes through SIGINT. The wartime deceivers cut their 
teeth in very particular circumstances.   
The Soviet threat posed different challenges, a different context. The LCS faced a more powerful, 
more secure enemy, at point when Britain was poor, demobilising and loosening security measures. 
By 1948 the JIC was certain the USSR was an implacable foe, and that Britain was outgunned.19 Its 
early estimates were inflated, but credited the Soviets with 170 divisions and 15,000 front-line 
aircraft, ‘enough to overrun Western Europe and to reach the Atlantic coast in forty days from the 
outbreak of hostilities’.20 The Soviets were also developing the bomb; they tested their first in 1949, 
years earlier than the JIC estimated.21 Additionally, Stalin’s USSR was a harder intelligence challenge 
than Hitler’s Germany. It was harder to penetrate; its communications security was superior; its 
internal security was effective; and its foreign intelligence capabilities unparalleled.22 JIC Chair, 
Harold Caccia, summed up the challenge, noting ‘in view of the difficulty of piercing the iron ring of 
Russian controlled territory “C’s” field is wider and task harder than ever before.’23 Repeating the 
double-agent and SIGINT based deceptions of the war was highly unlikely.  
The USSR’s strength limited the LCSs potential, but it also helped define their Cold War role: the 
organisation was, after all, rejuvenated in response to the Soviet threat. The matter of what exactly 
it should do took time to settle; deception policy continued to evolve to 1950. However, it was clear 
from 1947 that deception was to be linked to Britain’s primary strategic objective, deterrence. The 
reality of war with the USSR was underlined in the late 1940s, most notably in the Tizard report, 
which argued that Britain could not prevent atomic weapons being delivered onto its shores and 
could not survive another total war.24 Despite the JIC’s judgement that the Soviets were unlikely to 
attack before 1956, war by miscalculation was possible. Therefore, the main objective of British 
planners and politicians was to devise strategies of deterrence. This objective was most clearly 
stated in the 1952 Global Strategy Paper, but was visible for the preceding seven years. The Overall 
Strategic Plan of 1947 was, as Baylis states, ‘not a strategy for fighting a war against the Soviet 
                                                          
19 Percy Cradock, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World (London: John 
Murray, 2002) p.27. 
20 Cradock, Know Your Enemy, p.52. 
21 Michael S. Goodman, Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007) p.19. 
22 The Soviet’s foreign intelligence successes and internal repression are discussed in Christopher Andrew and 
Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West (London: Penguin, 2001), and Robert 
W. Pringle, ‘Modernisation of Terror: The Transformation of Stalin’s NKVD, 1934-1941’, International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 17/1 (2004). 
23 Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, (Bloomsbury: London, 2010), p.621. 
24 See Lewis, Changing Direction, chapter five ‘The Joint Technical Warfare Committee and the Future Nature 
of Warfare 1945-6’. 
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Union, but rather one for preventing it’.25 The CoS’s 1947 paper on Future Defence Policy noted that 
Britain had ‘to prevent war, provided that this can be done without prejudicing our vital interests.’ 
The LCS’s 1947 ‘Overall deception policy’ was drafted with reference to the CoS’s papers.26 The 
object of deception policy, it noted, was to ‘deter and if possible prevent the Russians and their 
satellites from armed aggression.’27  
By 1950 and the Korean War this policy was refined to reflect the range of circumstances in foreign 
and military policy where deception might play a role. The LCS and the CoS set out what they 
believed deception was for, and what the LCS could achieve. First, there was a planning function. 
The LCS worked closely with the CoS and the Joint Planners to ensure that national strategy and 
military plans had deceptive components. In 1951 it judged that ‘if war comes we have reasonable 
confidence that we can place in the hands of commanders in the field a weapon which, if it is not as 
finely tempered as the one we forged in the last war, will at the least prove a useful addition to our 
armoury’.28 Second, deception operations could be useful in an imperial context, in preventing the 
spread of Communism and for managing restive nationalistic leaders. Third, ‘opportunistic’ 
operations could be designed in response to contingencies or emergencies. Finally, there were ‘pure’ 
peacetime deceptions, designed to pursue British interests and imperial strategy. With regards the 
USSR these were concerned with deterring aggression, and subverting its strength.29 By 1950 the LCS 
was active in a number of areas, but supporting deterrence was its primary mission. 
 
Deception for Deterrence: Plans and Operations 
The precise scale and nature of British deception for deterrence in the early Cold War is obscured by 
official secrecy. Nevertheless certain operations can be examined. They illustrate that the LCS and 
the DFP were active and ambitious, but that their early large-scale plans for strategic deterrence 
often foundered before implementation. What remained were smaller operations, designed to 
distract the Soviets or give them pause.  
In 1947, the LCS concluded that, in principle, it could aid deterrence in several senses: by 
exaggerating the strength of British weapons; by emphasizing Britain’s willingness to use them at the 
                                                          
25 John Baylis, ‘The British Global Strategy Paper of 1952’, Journal of Strategic Studies 16/2 (1993) p.206. 
26 CAB 81/80, LCS (47) 4 (Final) ‘Overall Deception Policy: Immediate Future’, 29 July 1947. 
27 CAB 81/80, LCS (47) 10, ‘Overall Deception Policy – Immediate Future’, 3 November 1947. 
28 DEFE 28/179, ‘The Aims and Technique of Strategic Deception’. 
29 CAB 81/80, HC (49) 3 (Final), ‘Revised Overall Deception Policy: Immediate Future’, 1 March 1949. 
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outset of a war; and though political means.30 Within these broad categories it spawned a series of 
plans. In June 1947 it circulated a report on ‘Atomic Scientific Research and Production’, highlighting 
the potential to mislead the Soviets with regards research and technology. The most fruitful areas 
were advances in aircraft design, anti-aircraft weapons, and the production of fissile material.31 They 
also worked with the Admiralty to exaggerate the performance of Walter submarines.32 This was 
followed by a plan to deter a Soviet air attack by convincing them the Cabinet Defence Committee 
had agreed to disperse British forces and industry throughout the Commonwealth, guaranteeing a 
second-strike capability.33 This was accompanied by plans to protect British airbases in the Middle 
East by preventing the spread of Communism.34 Most early schemes came to nothing. In 1948, upon 
reviewing the overall deception concept for deterring atomic attack, the Hollis Committee judged it 
too ambitious. They believed it was possible to lay the foundations for deceptions emphasizing 
British strength, ability, ‘and intention vigorously to retaliate against any aggression’, but little 
more.35  
 
Indeed, the initial planning work conducted by the LCS was beset by many problems. The USSR’s raw 
power made it difficult for the LCS to concoct plausible weapons or orders of battle that would 
constitute a meaningful deterrent. Weak British security was also an issue; without wartime controls 
on movement and censorship it was difficult to maintain physical deceptions.36 Conversely, tight 
Soviet security rendered it less susceptible to deceptions. Additionally, it was inevitable that Cold 
War deception work would be conducted with the US, but their deception machinery was 
underdeveloped and many US commanders dismissed deception as a valuable tool. Owing to these 
factors for the first two years after 1947 the LCS concerned itself mainly with planning, and 
attempting to devise ways to convey deceptive information to the Soviets, rather than implementing 
operations.37  However, some plans were developed and pursued, in Europe and the Far East. They 
illustrate how the LCS operated in the more confined Cold War environment. They also underline 
that the early problems with planning and implementing Cold War deceptions remained largely 
irresolvable. 
European Operations and the HOUSE PARTY Committee 
                                                          
30 CAB 81/80, LCS (47)3, ‘Atomic Scientific Research and Production’, 9 June 1947. 
31 CAB 80/81, LCS (47) 3 (Preliminary Draft) ‘Atomic Scientific Research and Production’, 9 June 1947. 
32 DEFE 28/75, LCS 580/3-5, Minutes of Hollis Committee 30 November 1948. 
33 CAB 80/81, LCS (47) 7, ‘A Deception Policy for Peace Calculated to Assist the Future Defence of the United 
Kingdom Against Aggression by a Potential Enemy Using Weapons of Mass Destruction’ 17 September 1947. 
34 CAB 81/80, LCS (47) 6 , ‘The Spread of Communism – Middle East: Outline Plan’, 17 September 1947. 
35 DEFE 28/76 ‘Outline Deception Plan’, 9 April 1948. 
36 FO 1093/380, LCS (49) 1, ‘Review of Overall Deception Policy’, 7 January 1949. 
37 Lewis, Changing Direction, p.lxxxiv. 
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In 2010  Stephen Twigge and Len Scott published a research note examining a 1954 document 
proposing an operation to bolster deterrence by convincing the Soviets that British scientists had 
developed an anti-aircraft ‘death ray’. It was unclear then whether this was a whim or a genuine 
plan.38 Recent releases confirm that it was probably the latter, inspired by an earlier deterrence 
through deception scheme. 
The death ray project was the idea of a small committee of LCS men, atomic scientists and Drew, 
late in 1948. Their task was to examine the question of strategic and tactical deception once the 
Soviets developed nuclear weapons. They believed the West’s lead in atomic weaponry was the key 
factor in restraining Soviet aggression.  Of course, mutual possession of the bomb eventually 
resulted in uneasy stability. But atomic strategy was still in its infancy and the LCS believed 
deterrence was best maintained though superior weapons rather than mutual vulnerability. They 
concluded that Britain needed a weapon to trump the bomb; they concocted the ‘C’ project, a secret 
super-weapon.39 
The concept of a death ray was attributed to a mysterious ‘Professor X’.40 Professor X was, in all 
likelihood, Sir John Cockcroft, Director of Harwell, the British Atomic Energy Research Establishment. 
The idea was relatively simple: when conducting scientific research in the nuclear field, or perhaps 
radar, British scientists had discovered a technique for creating a ‘death ray’, lethal up to one mile, 
and deployable from the ground, sea or air.41 The Soviets would learn of it through controlled leaks, 
uncontrolled leaks from British personnel who had been themselves deceived, and physical means. 
Ideally, this would deter them from attacking. Fantastic as the project may sound, it was given 
serious consideration. A series of secret meetings took place late in 1948 to examine how it might be 
planned, managed and implemented. 
Early discussions focused on security and feasibility. If either aspect was flawed the project would 
fail. The immediate security problem related to the physical component of the plot, which would 
inevitably be substantial, involving facilities and numerous personnel. It would have been necessary 
to provide them with a plausible cover story that supported the plan. As Colonel H. Noel Wild, the 
LCS’s military man, noted ‘it should be treated in all respects as if it were indeed a fact and not a 
deception.’ Only a small number of people would know the genuine function of the facilities; all 
would be managed by the LCS.42 With careful planning this side of security was manageable. More 
                                                          
38 Twigge and Scott, ‘Strategic Defence by Deception’, pp.152-157. 
39 DEFE 28/102, ‘The “C” project’, 18 October 1948. 
40 DEFE 28/102, Wild, ‘The “C” project’, 17 September 1948; and ‘The “C” project’, 18 October 1948. 
41 DEFE 28/102, ‘The Stewart Project’, 24 September 1948. 
42 DEFE 28/102, ‘The “C” project’, 18 October 1948. 
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complicated was the matter of senior policy makers and officers, many of whom might have to be 
used in the deception, either wittingly or not. How and when to brief them about the operation and 
its objectives remained a puzzle.  
The matter of feasibility was for the scientists. The LCS organised a consultation with Professor Otto 
Frisch, the eminent physicist who had worked on the Manhattan project and headed nuclear physics 
at Harwell. When interviewed by Commander Eric Welsh, Britain’s atomic intelligence chief, Wild 
and Drew, he gave his endorsement, judging the concept plausible – had he heard reports that the 
Soviets were developing such a weapon, ‘it would cause him considerable alarm and anxiety’. In 
principle, the weapon could be manufactured to fit on a vehicle the size of a modern tank; it 
required an engine that could generate 1000 horse-power; and it would have to be remote control 
to protect its operators from radiation. Friche judged that the weapon could be lethal up to about 
640 meters.43  
The scientists both supported and undermined the project: it was feasible, but not at long or 
medium range. It posed a danger to its operators and could not be airborne. Therefore the death ray 
was reduced to a defensive weapon. However, this did not undermine the LCS’s enthusiasm for the 
project. It might not deter the bomb directly, they judged, but it might deter local aggression and 
escalation. Any invasion risked one side or the other using nuclear weapons. Despite the limited 
range, the questions of security, and the dangers of inspiring a Soviet death ray, they decided in 
January 1949 to pursue the project. The project was named HOUSE PARTY, which also became the 
name of a small committee managing high level deceptions against the USSR.44 And it quickly 
developed two distinct schemes, the death ray, and a political deception. 
 
The Death Ray 
The LCS moved on to consider the deterrent potential of the short range death ray. Continued 
scientific discussion revealed limitations beyond its range, particularly with regards the time enemy 
troops needed to be exposed for a lethal dose – some 15 minutes at 900 meters.45 Some questioned 
whether this would pose a meaningful deterrent if the Soviets were intent on starting a world war 
(indeed they may not be at all deterable if this was their true intention). But they believed there was 
potential for the weapon in deterring local aggression, which could potentially escalate.46 The 
                                                          
43 DEFE 28/102, ‘First meeting with Professor Otto Friche’ 30 December 1948. 
44 DEFE 28/102, Minutes of meeting 6 January, ‘House Party’, 6 January 1949. 
45 DEFE 28/102, Minutes of meeting 20 January, ‘House Party’, 20 January 1949. 
46 DEFE 28/102, ‘Note for Sir Findlater Stewart’, 20 January 1949. 
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HOUSE PARTY committee agreed that local deterrence was a practical objective, especially if used to 
deny the Soviets a valuable commodity, like oil. Despite some members questioning whether or not 
a less fanciful weapon might not be more feasible, Colonel Wild persuaded them to retain the 
concept, and resolved to develop the plan.47  
Wild took the concept of ‘the weapon’ to the Joint Planners. He believed it could supplement their 
nascent plans for wartime deception, plans designed to direct Soviet troops away from the North 
West German plains by threatening to breach the bank of the river Weser. The weapon, he judged, 
might be used to accelerate the process of flooding, or to attack immobilised Soviet troops.48 The 
primary challenge he faced was security: the LCS was wary of allowing knowledge of the deception 
to spread beyond HOUSE PARTY, and were equally wary of increasing the number of Soviets exposed 
to the deception. Not only could the plot unravel, but possession of the weapon could bring the UK 
into disrepute internationally. Worse, it could prompt the Soviets to deploy their resources to 
developing such a weapon. Nevertheless, the Commander of the British Army of the Rhine, Viscount 
Montgomery approved of plans to ‘establish in Germany a water obstacle supported by special 
means.’49 House Party’s atomic specialists, Professor Fry and Welsh, moved on to plan the 
instillations that would be required to mount the deception on a ten-mile front.50 As Wild had 
intimated, and as Montgomery had approved, this would probably be near a choke-point or an 
obstacle so as to maximise the exposure of advancing troops. 
The crucial question was when and how to leak the story to the Soviets: should they be told soon, 
during a period of rising tensions, or when war appeared imminent? If they were told early, and 
were sufficiently scared, they might be tempted to pre-empt; too late and the weapon might not 
affect their plans. HOUSE PARTY decided to be flexible: initially, they would let the Soviets do the 
work; it was likely that Soviet strategists assumed Britain would defend major rivers. The LCS would 
leak the plans to flood the Weser, and that the obstacle was supported by a new, secret weapon. 
The leak would be compatible with a cover story fed to allies as the weapon’s facilities were built. 
Finally, if war seemed imminent the LCS would leak the ‘true’ nature of the weapon.51 HOUSE PARTY 
hoped that this would function as a deterrent, give the Soviets pause, and let calmer heads prevail.  
Matters developed over March 1949 as Wild sought to integrate the deception firmly into allied 
defensive plans. It was crucial to have some consultation with allies; dissuading the Soviet attack on 
                                                          
47 DEFE 28/102, Minutes of meeting 20 January, ‘House Party’, 20 January 1949. 
48 DEFE 28/102, Minutes of meeting 20 January, ‘House Party’, 28 February 1949. 





the British line might make them stop and think, but might simply divert their attack. Montgomery’s 
Chief of Staff, General Ronald Belchem was set to meet General Hubener, the US General in charge 
of the US army of occupation, and consult about the possibility of British plans diverting Soviet 
forces onto his lines. He did not mention the deception.52  
Meanwhile planning for ‘the weapon’s’ facilities were on hold owing to production problems in 
Britain’s atomic industrial pipeline. The principal challenge was the beehive valve, a component in 
radar units and particle accelerators. The atomic scientists recommended to HOUSE PARTY that any 
construction related to the deception should be delayed lest the production problems leak and 
undermine the deception, or divert important personnel from genuine roles in the nuclear 
industry.53  
The production problems were overcome by April. The scientists reported to HOUSE PARTY that they 
had composed detailed plans of the weapon’s facilities. It required a modest building, some sixteen 
feet by four. But it required a cooling system and a generator, which were more substantial; Frisch 
estimated that the facilities required some 400 gallons of water a minute. They were also expensive: 
the initial developments could cost up to one million pounds, and each weapon thereafter about 
£30,000. Apparently content with this, HOUSE PARTY pushed the development of the plan, 
accepting the design of the weapon and encouraging Frisch to elaborate on his ideas for a more 
powerful weapon that required less generator power.54 
HOUSE PARTY maintained its enthusiasm because the production setback was balanced by 
developments that could help ensure that the ‘death ray’ story found purchase. Press articles had 
drawn the public’s attention to the dangers of bombardment by gamma radiation. These were 
related to a series of tests being carried out on HMS Arethusa, measuring the vulnerability of naval 
vessels to radiation, and ‘the somewhat sensationally quoted’ remarks of a noted German physics 
expert, Proefssor Heissenberg, about the possibility of ‘gun-projector’ radioactive weapons. HOUSE 
PARTY instructed Wild and Welsh to exploit the HMS Arethusa trials.55 They developed a relatively 
straightforward plan: a craft fitted with a convincing dummy weapon would periodically appear in 
the vicinity of the trials. John Cockcroft agreed to make an appearance to support the deception.56All 
they required was for Menzies to persuade the First Sea Lord to approve the operation. Given the 
                                                          
52 DEFE 28/102, House Party Meeting, 23 March 1949. 
53 Ibid. 
54 DEFE 28/102, House Party Meeting, 11 April 1949. 
55 DEFE 28/102, House Party Meeting, 23 March 1949. 
56 DEFE 28/102, House Party Meeting, 11 April 1949. 
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support the DFP received during later operations, such as those surrounding Britain’s first atomic 
tests in 1952, it is likely that the services would have supported the deception. 
The documentary trail runs cold at this point, but three details suggest that the operation was 
pursued further. First, the archival record suggests there is more to the operation; files pertaining to 
the HOUSE PARTY committee remain retained. Second, as the note uncovered by Twigge and Scott 
demonstrates, the idea of a ‘death ray’ deception remained in the minds of planners throughout the 
1950s.57 Third, the death ray was to have been a specific but very secretive component of a broader 
British deception scheme to be implemented in the event of war. The objective of this plan, the 
WESER Project, was to convince the Soviets that Western forces intended to defend the Weser-Elbe 
line thereby forcing the Soviets to advance through more closed country, south of the German 
plains, and gain more time for the genuine allied retreat to the Rhine.  Conceived in 1949, it 
foundered initially because ‘Anglo/US factual plans were in a state of some fluidity’, and because of 
the US Chiefs of Staff’s apparent dislike for deceptive operations. It lay dormant before Britain 
attempted to revive it in September 1952, probably with the super-weapon.58  
 
Political Deception  
Owing to the difficulties with the death ray the HOUSE PARTY Committee began to consider other 
ways to deter the Soviets. This began as a vague invitation for the Committee to ‘examine another 
line altogether’, but it was developed by Sir Brian Mountain, whose role on the committee is 
unclear. He suggested a more sophisticated approach to deterrence, one based on exploiting the 
adversary’s weaknesses rather than driving the arms race. He believed that the fundamental 
mistrust and suspicion that was pervasive in the Soviet Union, both between the people and their 
leaders, and between Russia and its satellites, could be exploited.   He suggested how in a note titled 
‘deterrent against Russians waging war’.59 
He believed the Soviets may react in a manner that suited British interests if they could be 
persuaded that they had problems with internal dissent. Soviet fighting power, he judged, depended 
significantly upon their ability to compel the masses, noting if ‘those in Supreme authority could be 
given cause to doubt their ability to hold down the nation, they would not commit them to war’.60 
Creating or amplifying these doubts would have taken time, but was plausible given the Soviets’ 
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record of paranoia and purges. He proposed creating the impression of an underground movement 
and supplementing it by framing an unwitting Russian citizen who was visiting or was based in the 
West, possibly an ambassador. HOUSE PARTY intended to plant sufficient materials on him to, in its 
words, ‘incriminate him to such an extent that he would be recalled for questioning. Through his 
innocence, he would be unable to answer many questions put to him, and would by denying his 
guilt, merely incriminate himself further, if the material was planted in him in a clever enough 
way’.61  
Little concern for the patsy’s fate is reflected in the memoranda. Indeed, if the plan worked as 
designed he would have been one of many. The intention was to create maximum disruption. As 
HOUSE PARTY noted, ‘the result that might accrue from all this would be either a purge, which could 
only do us good and the Russians harm, and if it came at such a time when the Russians were 
menacing world peace by exploiting another minority, might well result in deterring them from this, 
or better still from aggression if that was their motive.’62 Complicated and ruthless, they knew the 
operation ‘would require the greatest ingenuity and case in planning and artistry in 
implementation’.63 Although it remains unclear the degree to which past British, Soviet and indeed 
German operations influenced Mountain, it is striking how similar it was in concept to the operations 
the Soviet security services had run against the British during the inter war years, and were still 
running in Eastern Europe, building Soviet run resistance networks and drawing SIS and CIA funded 
emerges to their deaths.  
HOUSE PARTY adopted the idea.64 However, the plan was based on particular assumptions about the 
USSR and these needed testing. They required a Soviet perspective, and this was supplied by SIS. SIS 
had managed a Soviet aeronautical engineer named Lieutenant Colonel Grigori Tokaev since he 
defected in October 1947. Despite proving troublesome, he was the first high-level Soviet defector in 
Germany, and considered very valuable.65 Codenamed EXCISE, he was the clear choice for those who 
required insights into Soviet thinking. Over a series of meetings Tokaev confirmed that the premise 
of the operation was sound, giving the committee ‘a very clear indication of Russian strategic 
anxiety’. He noted that the key to success was ensuring the origin of the plot was well disguised; any 
hint of outside intervention would probably backfire.66  




64 DEFE 28/102, House Party, 2 February 1949. 
65 Jeffery, MI6, p.666. 
66 DEFE 28/102, ‘Meeting with EXCISE’, 22 February 1949.  
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HOUSE PARTY concurred. In its judgement, several criteria had to be met if the plan was to work. It 
required a plausible story, the means to reinforce the original deception once the Soviets became 
interested, and an appropriate Soviet politician or military figure. By late March 1949 Wild believed 
they had found their man, the Soviet General Staff Officer, General Aleksei Antonov. He was known 
to British intelligence and to the Soviets as having been involved in various subversive activities, and 
had survived, they judged, ‘through the betrayal of some of his comrades.’ This provided the LCS 
with a crucial piece of kindling: existing suspicion. Manipulating internal suspicions was far easier 
than exporting them from London. Ideally, the LCS planned to engineer a situation whereby the 
MGB would have acquired incriminating evidence implicating Antonov in some subversive activity. 
Once this was publicised, stories would have been leaked to the press tying in other prominent 
Soviets. As HOUSE PARTY explained, ‘a chain reaction of purge could be started within the General 
Staff of the Soviet Army, which if skilfully encouraged from without, might involve very important 
personalities, and cause the regime very serious embarrassment.’ This was ‘plan one’; Wild, Drew, 
Kirby, and another whose name remains redacted, began planning in detail.67 
They briefed HOUSE PARTY in April. Their objective remained to bolster deterrence by persuading 
the Soviets to focus internally. They judged it unlikely that the plan would have negative effects on 
any indigenous subversive networks. Indeed, some hoped the operation, even if not wholly 
successful, would prompt some implicated individuals to defect lest they become victims of a 
potential purge. HOUSE PARTY agreed and determined that the planning progress to the practical 
and technical stages. The plan required the Soviets to intercept incriminating radio traffic, so they 
required a transmitter, a suitable broadcasting location, and a Russian linguist. With C’s blessing this 
begin immediately; the Antonov element required more time, a detailed written plan and Foreign 
Office clearance, however an established history of suspicious radio intercepts would have probably 
helped incriminate him.68 The plan was adopted on 11 April 1949.  
The documentary trail runs cold following these minutes; the progression of the deceptions is 
difficult to judge. Nevertheless, some indications are discernible. General Antonov was not purged. 
Indeed, he was promoted Deputy Commander in Chief and then Commander in Chief of the Trans-
Caucasus Military District. By 1955, he was Chief of Staff of the Combined Forces of the Warsaw 
Pact. Clearly, this aspect failed. However there are glimpses available of how the political deception 
may have been applied more broadly, just as HOUSE PARTY intended. The plan to encourage the 
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USSR to focus internally, deterring them from external aggression by using fake radio signals, 
appears to have proceeded, under the codename FLITTER.  Files pertaining to the operation remain 
retained, but suggest several things. First, that the operation ran between 1950 and 1953, possibly 
until 1955; second, that it was radio based; and third, that like all the LCS’s successful operations it 
was based on a mix of fact and fiction.69 FLITTER was managed by HOUSE PARTY, chaired by Stuart 
Menzies, ‘C’, and received input from the broader intelligence community. Tokaev/EXCISE continued 
to act as advisor, commenting on developments in the Soviet Union that included the Leningrad 
purges of 1950-1951, and the tensions between Molotov and Stalin.70 Using his insights, FLITTER 
attempted to implicate plausible individuals in subversive plots. This included an individual who was 
considered by HOUSE PARTY to be ‘a very important oppositionist, but whom the MVD have never 
been able to identify,’ an alleged member of the Central Committee of the USSR, possibly Ivlev.71 
Tokaev suggested that Ivlev’s name could be used to authenticate the FLITTER messages, and they 
proceeded accordingly, planning to broadcast a series of suspicions messages, including ‘For Ivlev. 
Instructions received. Am awaiting new orders.’72 This was to be tied to a series of messages relating 
to discontent in Baku, linking Ivlev with subversive activities, and some pamphleteering. This would, 
HOUSE PARTY hoped, ‘foment genuine trouble’.73  
FLITTER was but one political operation conducted by the LCS that was designed to encourage the 
Soviets to focus internally. They also planned to smear staff in the Russian film industry, hopefully 
diverting MVD resources and possibly slowing the distribution of Soviet propaganda.74 Clearly the 
LCS was pushing on an open door in this regard. Little evidence suggests that their efforts prompted 
heavy handed MVD activity, but it is likely that it helped. As Richard Aldrich has argued, operations 
that suggested internal security problems, played directly into Stalin’s paranoia.75 And this glimpse 
into HOUSE PARTY’s activities provides clear evidence that Britain sought not only to maximise the 
impact of Stalin’s purges, but to instigate them and deter foreign adventurism. 
 
Deception and Deterrence in the Far East 
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British deception was not only targeted at Stalin, it was a tool for imperial security. Far Eastern 
activities included theatre defence by deterrence plans and more limited operations in colonial wars. 
The resources at the DFP’s disposal in these circumstances were small, and the more ambitious 
operations were often undermined by similar factors that undermined ambitious European schemes.  
The LCS established outposts in the Middle East and Far East in 1950. The Forward Planning Officer 
arrived in Singapore to begin work early in 1951. Initially the organisation was three officers strong, 
a Forward Planning Officer, at General Headquarters, a Federation Officer based with Special Branch 
in Kuala Lumpur, whose main role was to manage covert actions against the Malayan Communists, 
and a Tactical Officer who supported him.76 The Far Eastern cell, Forward Planning Section (FE), FPS 
(FE) operated for about three years before being cut back to a single member of staff who worked in 
the office of MI5’s Far East hub, Security Intelligence Far East.  
FPS (FE) was deployed with a clear brief to support theatre defence and help subdue rebels who 
threatened British rule. However, the complex environment and difficulties of working with allies 
made planning and implementing its schemes very difficult. Drew had suspected this would be the 
case, noting ‘the situation is much more complex and fluid than it is in the other two main 
theatres…’77 But he retained some optimism, informing the CoS in 1950 that deception might be of 
use in uncoupling China from the USSR. He believed plans could be drawn that ‘would play upon the 
known xenophobia of the Chinese and lead them to believe (what may well be the fact) that it is the 
Russian intention to make China as much a vassal state as Czechslovakia or Hungary.’ Drew went on 
to note that ‘this proposition might be tackled in various ways, e.g. by black propaganda inside China 
purporting to be Russian Communist in Origins and by the use of traditional Chinese secret societies 
who are in the main anti-communist because their normal activities of blackmail and the levying of 
‘protection’ money, etc, have been taken over by the Communists.’78 This optimism was short lived.  
Two FPS (FE) designed theatre defence plans are visible in the archives, one focused on Hong Kong, 
the other on a number of British territories, both a response to the Korean War. Both were defence 
by deterrence schemes, designed to convey the impression that fragile British outposts could be 
reinforced far quicker, and more robustly than in fact was the case. Both foundered for lack of 
international support. 
The Hong Kong plan was focused on deterring Chinese attack, and was presented to the Chiefs of 
Staff in July 1950. Judging invasion unlikely, the Joint Planners believed the Chinese would attempt 
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to undermine imperial control with subversive methods, combined with maintaining a robust 
external threat. FPS (FE) judged the best method to counter this was to demonstrate that British 
policy was to reinforce the garrison substantially in the event of any emergency, and to quell any 
uprising.79 Rumours were to be spread that air assets could be transferred from Malaya at short 
notice. The rumours were to be reinforced by covert measures, passing misleading information to 
specific secret ‘channels’, and also more the conspicuous steps of enlarging runways and facilities to 
prepare for extra aircraft and aircrew. Similar preparations would have been taken with regard 
ground troops: rumours spread, facilities prepared, and movement simulated. The instrument of 
deception in this case would have been the parachute regiment.80 FPS (FE) believed that Chinese 
observers would have taken note, and dissidents on Hong Kong would have been deterred from 
revolutionary action. 
The Joint Planners believed this plan had some merits, including not being particularly 
confrontational. It was also substantial enough to generate some reaction, and therefore a clue to 
China’s intentions. However, the CoS believed the situation too fluid to implement even marginally 
provocative deceptions. They deferred any action until reports on the actual possibilities for 
reinforcing Hong Kong became available, and until the US had been consulted.81 Owing to the latter 
factor, it is unlikely that the scheme was implemented in a significant form. US support was vital for 
a plausible deterrent, but productive US engagement in deception schemes was still some years 
away. 
The second plan was a theatre deception designed to defend Hong Kong and Malaya; it faced similar 
challenges. Planning was set in motion soon after the Forward Planning Officer’s arrival in the Far 
East, and the draft operation intended to produce a deterrent to Chinese attack by showing that 
Britain possessed sufficient forces to repel aggression, or make it too costly. It was first submitted to 
the Chiefs of Staff in August 1951, and eventually they approved of the concept by September the 
following year.  
It had three key components. Part one stressed the strength of allied cohesion in the Far East: an 
attack on one of the three powers would be considered an attack on all. The basis of this deception 
was the Washington talks between Churchill and Truman. It was to be leaked that during a secret 
session the President agreed that an attack against British interests would draw immediate 
American reaction. Planted public statements would have been made alluding to this agreement. 
These would have been reinforced by stories about advanced weaponry available for any operation 
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– including atomic, biological, and chemical munitions. Part two, related to Hong Kong, was designed 
to create the impression that any attack on the colony would be countered by retaliation not only 
locally, but on Chinese territory. Like part one, it depended on the availability of American forces, 
specifically naval and air forces based on the Philippines, Okinawa, and Taiwan. Part three was 
designed to persuade the Chinese that Malaya would be robustly defended and reinforced in the 
event of any attack.82   
The DFP believed they might secure US cooperation. But this hope was quickly dashed. The British 
military representatives in Washington revealed the US remained unlikely to accede to a theatre 
deception plan until the forthcoming five power talks on Far East strategy were complete. Even then, 
their deception machinery was undeveloped, and, in contrast to the UK, they had no set policy on 
the use of deception in peace. This rendered parts one and two impossible.83 Only part three was 
feasible, so Britain had to work with the Australians and the New Zealanders, who they approached 
late in 1952, gaining the approval of the Australian defence committee. But without broader support 
implementation of the plan was delayed. Ultimately it was overtaken by events, specifically SEATO, 
and the plan was rejected by the Australian Defence Minister.84 The failure highlighting, once again, 
the difficulty Britain had in implementing strategic deception in the Cold War environment.  
 
The Uses and Limits of Deception for Deterrence in the Early Cold War 
Two key factors account for the limited potential of British deterrence by deception schemes in the 
early Cold War. The first was the nature of Britain’s enemies. The LCS faced extremely robust 
enemies, as indeed did the broader intelligence community. This defined the objectives of 
deception, supporting deterrence, but it also limited the deception organisation’s potential as it 
limited the techniques at their disposal, and potentially undermined them from within. This was an 
intractable problem.  
The nature of the enemy presented three main challenges in terms of planning and implementing 
the deceptions. First, the Soviets were aware of British wartime deception operations; they would 
doubtless be more vigilant than the Germans.85 Second, and related, Soviet security agencies were 
extremely effective. Wartime strategic deception had utilised several trusted double-agent 
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‘channels’ to convey information to the Germans. But British intelligence found it extraordinarily 
difficult to develop reliable ‘channels’ into the USSR and China. Without double-agents deception 
operations relied on indirect, less effective methods, such as publishing misleading press articles, or 
working through trade missions. Indeed, trade missions offered the LCS a rare opportunity to feed 
disinformation directly into the Soviet bureaucracy, and they hoped to implement deceptions slowly 
over time by ‘drip feeding’ information to Soviet representatives.86 However, the technique was 
neither very quick nor very reliable.  
Third, British intelligence on its main Cold War rivals was poor. This affected deception planning 
because, as the wartime deceivers had learned, plans had to relate to the adversary’s specific beliefs 
and prejudices.87 Without good intelligence designing plausible deception was extremely 
problematic. Poor intelligence also affected implementation: it was very difficult to confirm whether 
or not the Soviets believed deceptions. Without feedback the LCS had little insight as to how it 
should adapt its operations; it was far more likely that the target could utilise the operation for its 
own ends; and there was little scope for ensuring that schemes designed to deter were not in fact 
provoking, or, in the case of the death ray, inspiring. The lack of feedback and the consequent 
danger of provocation remained visible in later Cold War operations, such as Operation CELESTIAL, a 
1957 plan designed to persuade the Soviets that US Thor intermediate range ballistic missiles that 
were based in the UK could be launched on warning, therefore ensuring retaliation; it was a 
consistent flaw in technical deception for deterrence operations.88 
The second factor inhibiting the LCS’s performance was the difficulty of working with allies. Several 
British deterrence-by-deception operations in the period in question were undermined because US 
commanders declined to offer their support. Having been eager practitioners of the art during the 
war the US deception machinery had fallen into disrepair by the late 1940s.89 Their main inter-
service deception body, known as the Orange Team, was small and not particularly active. In 
December 1947, Stuart Menzies noted his ‘grave doubts as to the ability of the Americans to take 
part in any active deception’.90 It was left to the nascent CIA to develop doctrine and capability. 
Drew commented in 1953 that he was ‘well content with the general atmosphere and the 
understanding of the possibilities of deception which I found in conversation with all the levels of 
CIA… unfortunately, I cannot say the same about the Orange Team’.91 The CIA eventually became 
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valuable partners. But even as late as 1957 the DFP believed that the Americans acknowledged 
British superiority in planning and implementing deception.92 
This affected British planning in the Far East. But it also affected plans in Europe. US disinterest 
affected the ‘C project’ indirectly, by compromising the complementary WESER Project. As noted 
above, this was a British plan designed to delay the Soviet advance across the north-west German 
plains in the event of an invasion. It originated from a draft deception plan penned by Major General 
David Belchem, then Chief of Staff to Bernard Montgomery, in December 1949.93 Belchem wanted to 
deter the Soviets from attacking, and persuade them that, were they to, Western plans were 
defensive and based upon defending West Germany at major water obstacles, namely the Elbe and 
the Weser; they would only retreat to the Rhine if absolutely necessary.94 His original plan was 
critiqued by the LCS, but they adopted and adapted the concept. They designed a scheme to gain 
time for a British withdrawal to the Rhine by persuading the Soviets that the north-west German 
plains were impassable. Their objective was exaggerating the degree to which it was possible to 
inundate the territory along the course of the river Weser, forcing the Soviets to advance through 
closer, more mountainous terrain to the South.95  They believed the plan was difficult to implement, 
but that any delay in Soviet advance would benefit Western troops.96  
The LCS worked to integrate other, more secretive, deterrence focused deceptions like the ‘C 
Project’ into the WESER Project. In March 1949 they sent a draft plan to the Western Union staff, 
where it was well received by Montgomery and some of his American colleagues.97 However, the 
security and coordination problems involved in implementing the scheme meant that little progress 
was achieved.  The plan sat dormant until late in 1952 when the LCS attempted to revive it in a 
limited manner in British sectors in Germany.98 Drew conceded that working in this limited manner 
clearly undermined the effectiveness of the plan, and that the three year delay was very 
detrimental. But this, he noted, was characteristic, explaining to General Whitley, Britain’s 
representative on the NATO Standing Group, that this was the ‘story of strategic deception planning 
in SHAPE. Here the moral is that the Americans don’t like the idea and probably never will until the 
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Joint Chiefs of Staff are converted – if they ever are.’99 Without the support of its most powerful ally 




The Chiefs of Staff endorsed deception as a viable tool for Cold War, as did SIS, despite 
understanding the constraints on its potential. However, as the early iteration of the super-weapon 
scheme, and DFP(FE)’s plans demonstrate, strategic deception was quickly proven impractical. Very 
little could be done to exaggerate British conventional strength in peacetime to plausibly constitute 
a meaningful deterrent. The Soviets capacity to gather intelligence on British forces put paid to large 
order of battle exaggerations. And maintaining large operations over indeterminate timescales was 
far more difficult without wartime levels of security and information control, or the support of allies. 
Instead the LCS/DFP had to focus on limited deception for deterrence operations, ones that 
distracted the Soviets or potentially halted escalation. The DFP seems to have applied this lesson to 
subsequent deterrence operations. Operation CELESTIAL, for example, relied on communicating 
largely accurate information about the missiles, coupled with judicious exaggeration, from an 
environment Britain could control.100  
By 1956 several factors had conspired to undermine the DFPs work. These factors included the 
George Blake case, and Soviet technological advances that rendered them less susceptible to 
scientific deceptions. One unidentified commentator noted that ‘it can be stated that from around 
1956 onwards we have lost much of the initiative in deception operations...’101 Prior to this, 
however, the early Cold War disappointments of the LCS’s deterrece operations did not dampen 
their enthusiasm. Britain did not jettison the concept of ambitious, strategic operations, but the 
discernible operations are aimed at weaker targets than the Soviets. These were targets against 
which Britain could exploit superior intelligence capability and benefit from feedback, for example 
the deceptions that accompanied British negotiations for the Baghdad Pact.102 The evidence also 
indicates the DFP planned and implemented schemes with objectives other than deterrence against 
a broad variety of targets in the early 1950s, including the USSR and China. These plans include 
Operation TIGRESS, a deception and cover plan accompanying Britain’s first atomic test in October 
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1952.103 Applying the lessons of the late 1940s, such operations had modest objectives and were 
limited in scope. Indeed, perhaps the most important legacy of the LCS’s early plans was forcing it to 
temper its ambitions. 
The limited number of sources available on the scope of Britain’s peacetime deceptions means that 
any conclusion must be considered preliminary. But the LCS and DFP doubtlessly had some utility in 
the Cold War. The primary goal, enhancing deterrence, was a worthy objective whilst Britain could 
not threaten atomic retaliation, and the right deception could potentially serve this purpose even by 
sowing a small seed of doubt in Soviet minds. More broadly, deception was another technique in 
fighting the USSR at a time when Europe lay in ruins and Stalinism was perceived to have the 
initiative; it was simply another manifestation of British covert action. But these factors must be 
balanced against the limits of deception. The most serious limitation was the lack of knowledge the 
LCS and British intelligence in general had on the Soviets’ dispositions. The difficulty in gaining useful 
feedback on their activities meant that deterrent plans could be interpreted as provocations. The 
parallels between the potentially provocative nature of the ‘C’ Project and Operation CELESTIAL 
suggests the deception planners might have been reluctant to acknowledge the danger that their 
plots might undermine rather than support British interests. How the Soviets interpreted the LCS 
and the DFP’s schemes remains an intriguing question. However, owing to the limited means at the 
deceivers’ disposal in conveying misleading information, and the Soviets’ own intelligence network, 
it is unlikely the LCS achieved anything other than muddying the waters. Mirroring the great 
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